to establish procedures for certain law enforcement officers of the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Crime Commission to obtain warrants and emergency authorisations that:

authorise the disruption of data held in computers; and

are likely to substantially assist in frustrating the commission of relevant offences; and

for access to, and disruption of, data held in a computer; and

in relation to one or more relevant offences.

data disruption warrants; or

emergency authorisations for disruption of data held in a computer.

the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; or

(b) any other person covered by subsection 32(1) of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986.

the Ombudsman; or

a Deputy Commonwealth Ombudsman; or

(c) a person who is a member of the staff referred to in subsection 31(1) of the Ombudsman Act 1976.

one or more relevant offences of a particular kind have been, are being, are about to be, or are likely to be, committed; and

(b) those offences involve, or are likely to involve, data held in a computer (the target computer); and

disruption of data held in the target computer is likely to substantially assist in frustrating the commission of one or more relevant offences that:

involve, or are likely to involve, data held in the target computer; and

are of the same kind as the relevant offences referred to in paragraph (a).

must specify:

the name of the applicant; and

the nature and duration of the warrant sought; and

subject to this section, must be supported by an affidavit setting out:

the grounds on which the warrant is sought; and

the things proposed to be authorised by the warrant in accordance with section 27KE; and

an assessment of how disruption of data held in the target computer is likely to substantially assist as described in paragraph (1)(c), to the extent that such an assessment is possible; and

an assessment of the likelihood that disruption of data held in the target computer will substantially assist as described in paragraph (1)(c), to the extent that such an assessment is possible.

immediate disruption of data held in the target computer referred to in subsection (1) is likely to substantially assist as described in paragraph (1)(c); and

it is impracticable for an affidavit to be prepared or sworn before an application for a warrant is made;

provide as much information as the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member considers is reasonably practicable in the circumstances; and

not later than 72 hours after the making of the application, send a duly sworn affidavit to the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member, whether or not a warrant has been issued.

a particular computer;

a computer on particular premises;

a computer associated with, used by or likely to be used by, a person (whose identity may or may not be known).

a law enforcement officer of the Australian Federal Police who is declared, in writing, by the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police to be an endorsing officer of the Australian Federal Police; or

a person who is in a class of law enforcement officers of the Australian Federal Police that is declared, in writing, by the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police to be a class of endorsing officers of the Australian Federal Police.

the law enforcement officer is a superintendent, or a person holding a higher rank, in the Australian Federal Police; and

the chief officer is satisfied that the law enforcement officer has the relevant skills, knowledge and experience to endorse the making of applications for the issue of data disruption warrants; and

the chief officer is satisfied that the law enforcement officer has completed all current internal training requirements relating to endorsing the making of applications for the issue of data disruption warrants.

each person in that class is a superintendent, or a person holding a higher rank, in the Australian Federal Police; and

the chief officer is satisfied that each person in that class has the relevant skills, knowledge and experience to endorse the making of applications for the issue of data disruption warrants; and

the chief officer is satisfied that each person in that class has completed all current internal training requirements relating to endorsing the making of applications for the issue of data disruption warrants.

a law enforcement officer of the Australian Crime Commission who is declared, in writing, by the chief officer of the Australian Crime Commission to be an endorsing officer of the Australian Crime Commission; or

a person who is in a class of law enforcement officers of the Australian Crime Commission that is declared, in writing, by the chief officer of the Australian Crime Commission to be a class of endorsing officers of the Australian Crime Commission.

the law enforcement officer is an executive level member of the staff of the Australian Crime Commission; and

the chief officer is satisfied that the law enforcement officer has the relevant skills, knowledge and experience to endorse the making of applications for the issue of data disruption warrants; and

the chief officer is satisfied that the law enforcement officer has completed all current internal training requirements relating to endorsing the making of applications for the issue of data disruption warrants.

each person in that class is an executive level member of the staff of the Australian Crime Commission; and

the chief officer is satisfied that each person in that class has the relevant skills, knowledge and experience to endorse the making of applications for the issue of data disruption warrants; and

the chief officer is satisfied that each person in that class has completed all current internal training requirements relating to endorsing the making of applications for the issue of data disruption warrants.

that there are reasonable grounds for the suspicion founding the application for the warrant; and

the disruption of data authorised by the warrant is reasonably necessary and proportionate, having regard to the offences referred to in paragraph 27KA(1)(c); and

in the case of an unsworn application—that it would have been impracticable for an affidavit to have been sworn or prepared before the application was made; and

in the case of a remote application—that it would have been impracticable for the application to have been made in person.

the nature and gravity of the conduct constituting the offences referred to in paragraph 27KA(1)(c); and

the likelihood that the disruption of data authorised by the warrant will frustrate the commission of the offences referred to in paragraph 27KA(1)(c); and

the existence of any alternative means of frustrating the commission of the offences referred to in paragraph 27KA(1)(c); and

the nature of the things proposed to be authorised by the warrant in accordance with section 27KE; and

the extent to which the execution of the warrant is likely to result in access to, or disruption of, data of persons lawfully using a computer, and any privacy implications (to the extent known) resulting from that access or disruption; and

any steps that are proposed to be taken to avoid or minimise the extent to which the execution of the warrant is likely to impact on persons lawfully using a computer; and

the extent to which the execution of the warrant is likely to cause a person to suffer a temporary loss of:

money; or

digital currency; or

property (other than data);

if:

the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member believes on reasonable grounds that the data covered by the warrant (within the meaning of section 27KE) is data of a person who is working in a professional capacity as a journalist or of an employer of such a person; and

each of the offences referred to in paragraph 27KA(1)(c) is an offence against a secrecy provision;

the public interest in protecting the confidentiality of the identity of the journalist’s source; and

the public interest in facilitating the exchange of information between journalists and members of the public so as to facilitate reporting of matters in the public interest; and

any previous warrant sought or issued under this Division in relation to the alleged relevant offences referred to in paragraph 27KA(1)(c).

whether that conduct amounts to:

an activity against the security of the Commonwealth; or

(ii) an offence against Chapter 5 of the Criminal Code;

whether that conduct amounts to:

an activity against the proper administration of Government; or

(ii) an offence against Chapter 7 of the Criminal Code;

whether that conduct:

causes, or has the potential to cause, serious violence, or serious harm, to a person; or

(ii) amounts to an offence against Chapter 8 of the Criminal Code;

whether that conduct:

causes, or has the potential to cause, a danger to the community; or

(ii) amounts to an offence against Chapter 9 of the Criminal Code;

whether that conduct:

causes, or has the potential to cause, substantial damage to, or loss of, data, property or critical infrastructure; or

(ii) amounts to an offence against Chapter 10 of the Criminal Code;

whether that conduct involves, or is related to, the commission of:

transnational crime; or

serious crime; or

organised crime;

the communication, divulging or publication of information; or

the production of, or the publication of the contents of, a document.

state that the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member issuing the warrant is satisfied of the matters referred to in subsection 27KC(1) and has had regard to the matters referred to in subsection 27KC(2); and

specify:

the name of the applicant; and

the alleged relevant offences referred to in paragraph 27KA(1)(c); and

the date the warrant is issued; and

if the target computer is or includes a particular computer—the computer; and

if the target computer is or includes a computer on particular premises—the premises; and

if the target computer is or includes a computer associated with, used by or likely to be used by, a known person—the person (whether by name or otherwise); and

the period during which the warrant is in force (see subsection (2)); and

the name of the law enforcement officer primarily responsible for executing the warrant; and

any conditions subject to which things may be done under the warrant.

inform the applicant of:

the terms of the warrant; and

the date on which, and the time at which, the warrant was issued; and

give the warrant to the applicant while retaining a copy of the warrant for the person’s own record.

entering specified premises for the purposes of doing the things mentioned in this subsection;

entering any premises for the purposes of gaining entry to, or exiting, the specified premises;

using:

the target computer; or

a telecommunications facility operated or provided by the Commonwealth or a carrier; or

any other electronic equipment; or

a data storage device;

(v) obtaining access to data (the relevant data) that is held in the target computer at any time while the warrant is in force, in order to determine whether the relevant data is covered by the warrant;

disrupting the relevant data at any time while the warrant is in force, if doing so is likely to assist in frustrating the commission of one or more relevant offences covered by the warrant;

if necessary to achieve the purpose mentioned in subparagraph (c)(v) or (vi)—adding, copying, deleting or altering other data in the target computer;

if, having regard to other methods (if any) of obtaining access to, or disrupting, the relevant data which are likely to be as effective, it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so:

using any other computer or a communication in transit to access or disrupt the relevant data; and

if necessary to achieve that purpose—adding, copying, deleting or altering other data in the computer or the communication in transit;

removing a computer or other thing from premises for the purposes of doing any thing specified in the warrant in accordance with this subsection, and returning the computer or other thing to the premises;

copying any data to which access has been obtained, and that:

appears to be relevant for the purposes of determining whether the relevant data is covered by the warrant; or

is covered by the warrant;

intercepting a communication passing over a telecommunications system, if the interception is for the purposes of doing any thing specified in the warrant in accordance with this subsection;

any other thing reasonably incidental to any of the above.

a data disruption warrant authorises the removal of a computer or other thing from premises as mentioned in paragraph (2)(f); and

a computer or thing is removed from the premises in accordance with the warrant;

access has been obtained to data; and

the data is subject to a form of electronic protection;

materially interfere with, interrupt or obstruct:

a communication in transit; or

the lawful use by other persons of a computer;

cause any other material loss or damage to other persons lawfully using a computer, unless the loss or damage is reasonably necessary, and proportionate, to do one or more of the things specified in the warrant.

authorise the use of any force against persons and things that is necessary and reasonable to do the things specified in the warrant; and

if the warrant authorises entering premises—state whether entry is authorised to be made at any time of the day or night or during stated hours of the day or night.

a data disruption warrant; or

this subsection;

any thing reasonably necessary to conceal the fact that any thing has been done under the warrant or under this subsection;

entering any premises where the computer is reasonably believed to be, for the purposes of doing the things mentioned in paragraph (c);

entering any other premises for the purposes of gaining entry to or exiting the premises referred to in paragraph (d);

removing the computer or another thing from any place where it is situated for the purposes of doing the things mentioned in paragraph (c), and returning the computer or other thing to that place;

if, having regard to other methods (if any) of doing the things mentioned in paragraph (c) which are likely to be as effective, it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so:

using any other computer or a communication in transit to do those things; and

if necessary to achieve that purpose—adding, copying, deleting or altering other data in the computer or the communication in transit;

intercepting a communication passing over a telecommunications system, if the interception is for the purposes of doing any thing mentioned in this subsection;

any other thing reasonably incidental to any of the above;

at any time while the warrant is in force or within 28 days after it ceases to be in force;

if none of the things mentioned in paragraph (c) are done within the 28-day period mentioned in paragraph (j)—at the earliest time after that 28-day period at which it is reasonably practicable to do the things mentioned in paragraph (c).

materially interfere with, interrupt or obstruct:

a communication in transit; or

the lawful use by other persons of a computer;

cause any other material loss or damage to other persons lawfully using a computer, unless the loss or damage is reasonably necessary, and proportionate, to do one or more of the things specified in the warrant or authorised by subsection (9).

the warrant must not be executed in a manner that results in loss or damage to data unless the damage is reasonably necessary, and proportionate, to do one or more of the things specified in the warrant or authorised by subsection (9);

the warrant must not be executed in a manner that causes a person to suffer a permanent loss of:

money; or

digital currency; or

property (other than data).

for an extension of the warrant for a period of no more than 90 days after the day the warrant would otherwise expire; or

for a variation of any of the other terms of the warrant.

an eligible Judge or nominated AAT member revokes a warrant; and

at the time of the revocation, a law enforcement officer is executing the warrant;

the data disruption warrant has been sought by or on behalf of a law enforcement officer; and

the chief officer of the law enforcement agency to which the law enforcement officer belongs or is seconded is satisfied that access to, and disruption of, data under the warrant is no longer required for the purposes referred to in paragraph 27KA(1)(c);

each House of the Parliament;

the members of each House of the Parliament;

the committees of each House of the Parliament and joint committees of both Houses of the Parliament.

an imminent risk of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property exists; and

disruption of data held in the target computer is immediately necessary for the purpose of dealing with that risk; and

there are no alternative methods that:

could have been used by law enforcement officers to help reduce or avoid that risk; and

are likely to be as effective as disruption of data held in the target computer; and

the circumstances are so serious and the matter is of such urgency that disruption of data held in the target computer is warranted; and

it is not practicable in the circumstances to apply for a data disruption warrant.

a particular computer;

a computer on particular premises;

a computer associated with, used by or likely to be used by, a person (whose identity may or may not be known).

the extent to which the execution of the emergency authorisation is likely to result in access to, or disruption of, data of persons lawfully using a computer; and

whether the likely impact of the execution of the emergency authorisation on persons lawfully using a computer is proportionate, having regard to the risk of serious violence or substantial damage referred to in paragraph (1C)(a).

the authorisation must not be executed in a manner that results in damage to data unless the damage is reasonably necessary and proportionate, having regard to the risk of serious violence or substantial damage referred to in paragraph (1C)(a);

the authorisation must not be executed in a manner that causes a person to suffer a permanent loss of:

money; or

digital currency; or

property (other than data).

must specify:

the name of the applicant for the approval; and

if a warrant is sought—the nature and duration of the warrant; and

must be supported by an affidavit setting out the grounds on which the approval (and warrant, if any) is sought; and

must be accompanied by a copy of the written record made under section 31 in relation to the emergency authorisation.

the nature of the risk of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property;

the extent to which issuing a data disruption warrant would have helped reduce or avoid the risk;

the extent to which law enforcement officers could have used alternative methods to help reduce or avoid the risk;

how much the use of alternative methods could have helped reduce or avoid the risk;

how much the use of alternative methods would have prejudiced the safety of the person or property because of delay or for another reason;

whether or not it was practicable in the circumstances to apply for a data disruption warrant.

there was a risk of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property; and

disruption of data held in the target computer mentioned in that subsection may have helped reduce the risk; and

it was not practicable in the circumstances to apply for a data disruption warrant.

unless paragraph (b) applies—issue a data disruption warrant relating to the continued access to, and disruption of, data held in the relevant target computer as if the application for the approval were an application for a data disruption warrant under Division 5 of Part 2; or

if the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member is satisfied that, since the application for the emergency authorisation, the activity that required access to, and disruption of, data held in the relevant target computer has ceased—order that access to, and disruption of, data held in that computer cease.

order that access to, and disruption of, data held in the relevant target computer cease; or

if the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member is of the view that, although the situation did not warrant the emergency authorisation at the time that authorisation was given, the use of a data disruption warrant under Division 5 of Part 2 is currently justified—issue a data disruption warrant relating to the subsequent access to, and disruption of, such data as if the application for the approval were an application for a data disruption warrant under Division 5 of Part 2.

each House of the Parliament;

the members of each House of the Parliament;

the committees of each House of the Parliament and joint committees of both Houses of the Parliament.

in a foreign country; or

on a vessel or aircraft that is registered under the law of a foreign country and that is in or above waters beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea of Australia;

an application is made under section 33 by an appropriate authorising officer for approval of the giving of an emergency authorisation; and

the emergency authorisation was given in response to an application under subsection 28(1C); and

before the completion of consideration of that section 33 application, it becomes apparent to the applicant that there will be a need for access to, and disruption of, data held in a computer:

in a foreign country; or

on a vessel or aircraft that is registered under the law of a foreign country and that is in or above waters beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea of Australia;

a data disruption warrant has been issued; and

after the issue of the warrant, it becomes apparent to the law enforcement officer primarily responsible for executing the warrant that there will be a need for access to, and disruption of, data held in a computer that is:

in a foreign country; or

on a vessel or aircraft that is registered under the law of a foreign country and that is in or above waters beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea of Australia;

the person, or each of the persons, responsible for executing the warrant will be physically present in Australia; and

the location where the data is held is unknown or cannot reasonably be determined.

a vessel that is registered under the law of a foreign country is in waters beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea of Australia but not beyond the outer limits of the contiguous zone of Australia; and

the relevant offences in respect of which it becomes apparent that access to, and disruption of, data held in a computer on the vessel will be required are offences relating to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws of Australia;

a vessel that is registered under the law of a foreign country is in waters beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea of Australia but not beyond the outer limits of the Australian fishing zone; and

(b) the relevant offences in respect of which it becomes apparent that access to, and disruption of, data held in a computer on the vessel will be required are offences against Fisheries Management Act 1991 or section 46A, 46B, 46C, 46D, 49A or 51A of the Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984;section 100, 100A, 100B, 101, 101A or 101AA of the

in a foreign country; or

on a vessel or aircraft that is registered under the law of a foreign country;

any information (other than data disruption intercept information) obtained from access to, or disruption of, data under:

a data disruption warrant; or

an emergency authorisation for disruption of data held in a computer; or

in a case where the information was obtained, purportedly under a data disruption warrant or an emergency authorisation for disruption of data held in a computer, through access to, or disruption of, data held in a computer in a foreign country, or on a vessel or aircraft that is registered under the law of a foreign country and that is in or above waters beyond the outer limit of Australia’s territorial sea—without the agreement of the appropriate consenting official of that foreign country, and of any other foreign country, whose agreement is required under section 43C;

disrupting data held in a computer;

is necessary for the fair trial of the defendant; or

is in the public interest.

a computer; or

a telecommunications facility operated or provided by the Commonwealth or a carrier; or

any other electronic equipment; or

a data storage device;

disrupting data held in the computer;

obtaining access to data held in the computer;

a data disruption warrant; or

an emergency authorisation for disruption of data held in a computer.

a data disruption warrant for disruption of data held in a computer; or

an emergency authorisation for disruption of data held in a computer;

state whether the warrant or authorisation was executed; and

if so:

state the name of the person primarily responsible for the execution of the warrant or authorisation; and

state the name of each person involved in accessing or disrupting data under the warrant or authorisation; and

state the period during which the data was accessed or disrupted; and

state the name, if known, of any person whose data was accessed or disrupted; and

give details of any premises at which the computer was located; and

give details of the benefit of the use of the warrant or authorisation in frustrating criminal activity; and

give details of the access to, and disruption of, data under the warrant or authorisation; and

give details of the compliance with the conditions (if any) to which the warrant or authorisation was subject; and

if the warrant or authorisation was extended or varied, state:

the number of extensions or variations; and

the reasons for them.

a data disruption warrant was issued in response to an application made by a law enforcement officer of a law enforcement agency; and

a thing mentioned in subsection 27KE(2) was done under the warrant;

notify the Ombudsman:

that the warrant was issued; and

of the fact that the thing was done under the warrant; and

do so within 7 days after the thing was done.

a data disruption warrant was issued in response to an application made by a law enforcement officer of a law enforcement agency; and

the person executing the warrant becomes aware that a thing mentioned in subsection 27KE(2) that was done under the warrant has caused material loss or damage to one or more persons lawfully using a computer;

notify the Ombudsman:

that the thing has caused material loss or damage to one or more persons lawfully using a computer; and

of the particulars of that loss or damage; and

do so within 7 days after the person executing the warrant became so aware.

if the agency is the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Crime Commission—the kinds of offences targeted by data disruption warrants issued during that year in response to applications made by or on behalf of law enforcement officers of the agency; and

the communication by a person to another person of; or

the making use of; or

the making of a record of; or

the custody of a record of;

a data disruption warrant; or

an emergency authorisation for disruption of data held in a computer.

a person suffers loss or injury as a result of the use of:

a computer; or

a telecommunications facility operated or provided by the Commonwealth or a carrier; or

any other electronic equipment; or

a data storage device;

the use of the computer, facility, equipment or device, as the case may be, was authorised by an emergency authorisation for disruption of data held in a computer; and

the giving of the emergency authorisation was not approved under section 35B;

such compensation as is agreed on between the Commonwealth and that person; or

in default of such an agreement—such compensation as is determined by action against the Commonwealth in a court of a State or Territory that has jurisdiction in relation to the matter.

disrupt data held in a computer that is the subject of:

a data disruption warrant; or

an emergency authorisation given in response to an application under subsection 28(1C);

access data that is held in the computer described in paragraph (a);

copy data held in the computer described in paragraph (a) to a data storage device;

convert into documentary form or another form intelligible to a law enforcement officer:

data held in the computer described in paragraph (a); or

data held in a data storage device to which the data was copied as described in paragraph (c).

in a case where the computer is the subject of a data disruption warrant—disruption of data held in the computer is:

likely to substantially assist in frustrating the commission of the offences that are covered by the warrant (within the meaning of section 27KE); and

justifiable and proportionate, having regard to those offences; and

in a case where the computer is the subject of a data disruption warrant—the assistance order is reasonable and necessary to enable the warrant to be executed; and

in a case where the computer is the subject of a data disruption warrant—the assistance order is justifiable and proportionate, having regard to:

the nature and gravity of the conduct constituting the offences referred to in paragraph 27KA(1)(c); and

the likely impact of compliance with the assistance order on the specified person, so far as that matter is known to the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member; and

the likely impact of compliance with the assistance order on other persons (including persons who may lawfully be using the computer), so far as that matter is known to the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member; and

in a case where the computer is the subject of an emergency authorisation given in response to an application under subsection 28(1C):

there is an imminent risk of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property; and

disruption of data held in the computer is immediately necessary for the purpose of dealing with the risk; and

in a case where the computer is the subject of an emergency authorisation given in response to an application under subsection 28(1C)—the assistance order is reasonable and necessary to enable the emergency authorisation to be executed; and

in a case where the computer is the subject of an emergency authorisation given in response to an application under subsection 28(1C)—the assistance order is justifiable and proportionate, having regard to:

the risk of serious violence or substantial damage referred to in paragraph 28(1C)(a); and

the likely impact of compliance with the assistance order on the specified person, so far as that matter is known to the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member; and

the likely impact of compliance with the assistance order on other persons (including persons who may lawfully be using the computer), so far as that matter is known to the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member; and

in a case where:

the computer is the subject of a data disruption warrant; and

the assistance order requires the specified person to provide information or assistance to allow the law enforcement officer to do a thing referred to in paragraph (1)(b), (c) or (d) in relation to data;

in a case where:

the computer is the subject of an emergency authorisation given in response to an application under subsection 28(1C); and

the assistance order requires the specified person to provide information or assistance to allow the law enforcement officer to do a thing referred to in paragraph (1)(b), (c) or (d) in relation to data;

the specified person is:

in a case where the computer is the subject of a data disruption warrant—reasonably suspected of having committed any of the relevant offences referred to in paragraph 27KA(1)(c); or

in a case where the computer is the subject of emergency authorisation—reasonably suspected of having committed the relevant offence referred to in subsection 28(1C); or

the owner or lessee of the computer; or

an employee of the owner or lessee of the computer; or

a person engaged under a contract for services by the owner or lessee of the computer; or

a person who uses or has used the computer; or

a person who is or was a system administrator for the system including the computer; and

the specified person has relevant knowledge of:

the computer or a computer network of which the computer forms or formed a part; or

measures applied to protect data held in the computer.

another order under this section; or

an order under section 64A of this Act; or

(c) an order under Crimes Act 1914;section 3LA or 3ZZVG of the

in compliance with an assistance order; or

in good faith in purported compliance with an assistance order.

the person is subject to an order under this section; and

the person is capable of complying with a requirement in the order; and

the person omits to do an act; and

the omission contravenes the requirement.

data is disrupted purportedly under:

a data disruption warrant; or

an emergency authorisation for disruption of data held in a computer; and

there is a defect or irregularity in relation to the warrant or emergency authorisation; and

but for that defect or irregularity, the warrant or emergency authorisation would be a sufficient authority for disrupting the data;

a data disruption warrant; or

an emergency authorisation for disruption of data held in a computer;

communicate data disruption intercept information to another person; or

make use of data disruption intercept information; or

make a record of data disruption intercept information; or

give data disruption intercept information in evidence in a proceeding.

communicate data disruption intercept information to another person; or

make use of data disruption intercept information; or

make a record of data disruption intercept information;

activities that present a significant risk to a person’s safety;

(e) acting for, or on behalf of, a foreign power (within the meaning of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979);

activities that are, or are likely to be, a threat to security;

(g) activities that pose a risk, or are likely to pose a risk, to the operational security (within the meaning of the Intelligence Services Act 2001) of ASIS (within the meaning of that Act);

(h) activities that pose a risk, or are likely to pose a risk, to the operational security (within the ordinary meaning of that expression) of the Organisation or of AGO or ASD (within the meanings of the Intelligence Services Act 2001);

(i) activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the movement of goods listed from time to time in the Defence and Strategic Goods List (within the meaning of regulation 13E of the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958);

(j) activities related to a contravention, or an alleged contravention, by a person of a UN sanction enforcement law (within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945).

the performance by an Ombudsman official of the Ombudsman official’s functions or duties; or

the exercise by an Ombudsman official of the Ombudsman official’s powers;

the performance by the Ombudsman official of the Ombudsman official’s functions or duties; or

the exercise by the Ombudsman official of the Ombudsman official’s powers;

the performance by an IGIS official of the IGIS official’s functions or duties; or

the exercise by an IGIS official of the IGIS official’s powers;

the performance by the IGIS official of the IGIS official’s functions or duties; or

the exercise by the IGIS official of the IGIS official’s powers;

information was obtained by intercepting a communication passing over a telecommunications system; and

the interception was purportedly for the purposes of doing a thing specified in a data disruption warrant; and

the interception was not authorised by the data disruption warrant;

a person may, in connection with:

the performance by an Ombudsman official of the Ombudsman official’s functions or duties; or

the exercise by an Ombudsman official of the Ombudsman official’s powers;

an Ombudsman official may, in connection with:

the performance by the Ombudsman official of the Ombudsman official’s functions or duties; or

the exercise by the Ombudsman official of the Ombudsman official’s powers;

a person may, in connection with:

the performance by an IGIS official of the IGIS official’s functions or duties; or

the exercise by an IGIS official of the IGIS official’s powers;

an IGIS official may, in connection with:

the performance by the IGIS official of the IGIS official’s functions or duties; or

the exercise by the IGIS official of the IGIS official’s powers;

accessing a stored communication under a data disruption warrant; or

to establish procedures for the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Crime Commission to obtain warrants that:

authorise access to data held in computers; and

will substantially assist in the collection of intelligence that relates to criminal networks of individuals; and

for access to data held in a computer; and

in relation to the collection of intelligence that relates to a criminal network of individuals.

use the same electronic service as at least one other individual in the group;

communicate with at least one other individual in the group by electronic communication.

whether in the form of text; or

whether in the form of data; or

whether in the form of speech, music or other sounds; or

whether in the form of visual images (animated or otherwise); or

whether in any other form; or

whether in any combination of forms;

in a case where each individual in the group uses, or is likely to use, the same electronic service as at least one other individual in the group—the use of that electronic service enables any of the individuals in the group to:

engage in conduct that constitutes a relevant offence; or

communicate with any of the individuals in the group about any of the individuals in the group engaging in conduct that constitutes a relevant offence; or

facilitate the engagement, by another person (whether or not an individual in the group), in conduct that constitutes a relevant offence; or

communicate with any of the individuals in the group about facilitating the engagement, by another person (whether or not an individual in the group), in conduct that constitutes a relevant offence; or

in a case where each individual in the group communicates with at least one other individual in the group by electronic communication—the electronic communication enables any of the individuals in the group to:

engage in conduct that constitutes a relevant offence; or

communicate with any of the individuals in the group about any of the individuals in the group engaging in conduct that constitutes a relevant offence; or

facilitate the engagement, by another person (whether or not an individual in the group), in conduct that constitutes a relevant offence; or

communicate with any of the individuals in the group about facilitating the engagement, by another person (whether or not an individual in the group), in conduct that constitutes a relevant offence.

the identities of the individuals in the group can be ascertained; or

the details of the relevant offences can be ascertained; or

there are likely to be changes, from time to time, in the composition of the group.

a group of individuals is a criminal network of individuals; and

(b) access to data held in a computer (the target computer) that is, from time to time, used, or likely to be used, by any of the individuals in the group will substantially assist in the collection of intelligence that:

relates to the group or to any of the individuals in the group; and

is relevant to the prevention, detection or frustration of one or more kinds of relevant offences.

the identities of the individuals in the group can be ascertained; or

the target computer can be identified; or

the location of the target computer can be identified; or

there are likely to be changes, from time to time, in the composition of the group.

must specify:

the name of the applicant; and

the nature and duration of the warrant sought; and

subject to this section, must be supported by an affidavit setting out the grounds on which the warrant is sought.

immediate access to data held in the target computer referred to in subsection (1) will substantially assist as described in paragraph (1)(b); and

it is impracticable for an affidavit to be prepared or sworn before an application for a warrant is made by the chief officer;

provide as much information as the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member considers is reasonably practicable in the circumstances; and

not later than 72 hours after the making of the application, send a duly sworn affidavit to the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member, whether or not a warrant has been issued.

must be a computer that is, from time to time, used or likely to be used by an individual (whose identity may or may not be known); and

may be one or more of the following:

a particular computer;

a computer that is, from time to time, on particular premises.

that there are reasonable grounds for the suspicion founding the application for the warrant; and

that the issue of the warrant is justified and proportionate, having regard to the kinds of offences in relation to which information will be obtained under the warrant; and

in the case of an unsworn application—that it would have been impracticable for an affidavit to have been sworn or prepared before the application was made; and

in the case of a remote application—that it would have been impracticable for the application to have been made in person.

the nature and gravity of the conduct constituting the kinds of offences in relation to which information will be obtained under the warrant; and

the extent to which access to data under the warrant will assist in the collection of intelligence that:

relates to the group referred to in paragraph 27KK(1)(a) or to any of the individuals in the group; and

is relevant to the prevention, detection or frustration of one or more kinds of relevant offences; and

the likely intelligence value of any information sought to be obtained; and

whether the things authorised by the warrant are proportionate to the likely intelligence value of any information sought to be obtained; and

the existence of any alternative, or less intrusive, means of obtaining the information sought to be obtained; and

the extent to which the execution of the warrant is likely to result in access to data of persons who are lawfully using a computer, and any privacy implications (to the extent known to the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member) resulting from that access; and

if:

the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member believes on reasonable grounds that the data covered by the warrant (within the meaning of section 27KP) is data of a person who is working in a professional capacity as a journalist or of an employer of such a person; and

each of the offences referred to in paragraph 27KK(1)(b) is an offence against a secrecy provision;

the public interest in protecting the confidentiality of the identity of the journalist’s source; and

the public interest in facilitating the exchange of information between journalists and members of the public so as to facilitate reporting of matters in the public interest; and

any previous warrant sought or issued under this Division in relation to the group referred to in paragraph 27KK(1)(a).

whether that conduct amounts to:

an activity against the security of the Commonwealth; or

(ii) an offence against Chapter 5 of the Criminal Code;

whether that conduct amounts to:

an activity against the proper administration of Government; or

(ii) an offence against Chapter 7 of the Criminal Code;

whether that conduct:

causes, or has the potential to cause, serious violence, or serious harm, to a person; or

(ii) amounts to an offence against Chapter 8 of the Criminal Code;

whether that conduct:

causes, or has the potential to cause, a danger to the community; or

(ii) amounts to an offence against Chapter 9 of the Criminal Code;

whether that conduct:

causes, or has the potential to cause, substantial damage to, or loss of, data, property or critical infrastructure; or

(ii) amounts to an offence against Chapter 10 of the Criminal Code;

whether that conduct involves, or is related to, the commission of:

transnational crime; or

serious crime; or

organised crime;

notify the issue of the warrant to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; and

do so within 7 days after the issue of the warrant.

the communication, divulging or publication of information; or

the production of, or the publication of the contents of, a document.

state that the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member issuing the warrant is satisfied of the matters referred to in subsection 27KM(1) and has had regard to the matters referred to in subsection 27KM(2); and

specify:

the name of the applicant; and

the kinds of relevant offences in respect of which the warrant is issued; and

the criminal network of individuals to which the warrant relates; and

the date the warrant is issued; and

the period during which the warrant is in force (see subsection (2)); and

the name of the law enforcement officer primarily responsible for executing the warrant; and

any conditions subject to which things may be done under the warrant; and

if the warrant authorises the use of a surveillance device—specify:

the surveillance device authorised to be used; and

the purpose or purposes for which the surveillance device may be used under the warrant.

inform the applicant of:

the terms of the warrant; and

the date on which, and the time at which, the warrant was issued; and

give the warrant to the applicant while retaining a copy of the warrant for the person’s own record.

entering specified premises for the purposes of doing the things mentioned in this subsection;

entering any premises for the purposes of gaining entry to, or exiting, the specified premises;

using:

the target computer; or

a telecommunications facility operated or provided by the Commonwealth or a carrier; or

any other electronic equipment; or

a data storage device;

if necessary to achieve the purpose mentioned in paragraph (c)—adding, copying, deleting or altering other data in the target computer;

if, having regard to other methods (if any) of obtaining access to the relevant data which are likely to be as effective, it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so:

using any other computer or a communication in transit to access the relevant data; and

if necessary to achieve that purpose—adding, copying, deleting or altering other data in the computer or the communication in transit;

removing a computer or other thing from premises for the purposes of doing any thing specified in the warrant in accordance with this subsection, and returning the computer or other thing to the premises;

copying any data to which access has been obtained, and that:

appears to be relevant for the purposes of determining whether the relevant data is covered by the warrant; or

is covered by the warrant;

intercepting a communication passing over a telecommunications system, if the interception is for the purposes of doing any thing specified in the warrant in accordance with this subsection;

using a surveillance device for the purposes of doing any thing specified in the warrant in accordance with this subsection;

any other thing reasonably incidental to any of the above.

a network activity warrant authorises the removal of a computer or other thing from premises as mentioned in paragraph (2)(f); and

a computer or thing is removed from the premises in accordance with the warrant;

access has been obtained to data; and

the data is subject to a form of electronic protection;

materially interfere with, interrupt or obstruct:

a communication in transit; or

the lawful use by other persons of a computer;

cause any other material loss or damage to other persons lawfully using a computer.

authorise the use of any force against persons and things that is necessary and reasonable to do the things specified in the warrant; and

if the warrant authorises entering premises—state whether entry is authorised to be made at any time of the day or night or during stated hours of the day or night.

a network activity warrant; or

this subsection;

any thing reasonably necessary to conceal the fact that any thing has been done under the warrant or under this subsection;

entering any premises where the computer is reasonably believed to be, for the purposes of doing the things mentioned in paragraph (c);

entering any other premises for the purposes of gaining entry to or exiting the premises referred to in paragraph (d);

removing the computer or another thing from any place where it is situated for the purposes of doing the things mentioned in paragraph (c), and returning the computer or other thing to that place;

if, having regard to other methods (if any) of doing the things mentioned in paragraph (c) which are likely to be as effective, it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so:

using any other computer or a communication in transit to do those things; and

if necessary to achieve that purpose—adding, copying, deleting or altering other data in the computer or the communication in transit;

intercepting a communication passing over a telecommunications system, if the interception is for the purposes of doing any thing mentioned in this subsection;

using a surveillance device, if the use is for the purposes of doing any thing mentioned in this subsection;

any other thing reasonably incidental to any of the above;

at any time while the warrant is in force or within 28 days after it ceases to be in force;

if none of the things mentioned in paragraph (c) are done within the 28-day period mentioned in paragraph (k)—at the earliest time after that 28-day period at which it is reasonably practicable to do the things mentioned in paragraph (c).

materially interfere with, interrupt or obstruct:

a communication in transit; or

the lawful use by other persons of a computer;

cause any other material loss or damage to other persons lawfully using a computer.

for an extension of the warrant for a period of no more than 90 days after the day the warrant would otherwise expire; or

for a variation of any of the other terms of the warrant.

notify the extension or variation to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; and

do so within 7 days after the extension or variation.

if the warrant was issued in response to an application made by the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police—the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police must, by instrument in writing, revoke the warrant; or

if the warrant was issued in response to an application made by the chief officer of the Australian Crime Commission—the chief officer of the Australian Crime Commission must, by instrument in writing, revoke the warrant.

if the warrant was issued in response to an application made by the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police—the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police; or

if the warrant was issued in response to an application made by the chief officer of the Australian Crime Commission—the chief officer of the Australian Crime Commission.

an eligible Judge or nominated AAT member revokes a warrant; and

at the time of the revocation, a law enforcement officer is executing the warrant;

a network activity warrant was issued in response to an application made by the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Crime Commission; and

an eligible Judge or nominated AAT member revokes the warrant;

notify the revocation to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; and

do so within 7 days after the revocation.

notify the revocation to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; and

do so within 7 days after the revocation.

the warrant was sought by the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Crime Commission; and

the chief officer is satisfied that access to data under the warrant is no longer required for the purpose referred to in paragraph 27KK(1)(b);

the warrant was sought by the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Crime Commission; and

the chief officer is notified that the warrant has been revoked by an eligible Judge or a nominated AAT member under section 27KR;

each House of the Parliament;

the members of each House of the Parliament;

the committees of each House of the Parliament and joint committees of both Houses of the Parliament.

in a foreign country; or

on a vessel or aircraft that is registered under the law of a foreign country and that is in or above waters beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea of Australia;

a network activity warrant has been issued; and

after the issue of the warrant, it becomes apparent to the law enforcement officer primarily responsible for executing the warrant that there will be a need for access to data held in a computer that is:

in a foreign country; or

on a vessel or aircraft that is registered under the law of a foreign country and that is in or above waters beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea of Australia;

the person, or each of the persons, responsible for executing the warrant will be physically present in Australia; and

the location where the data is held is unknown or cannot reasonably be determined.

a vessel that is registered under the law of a foreign country is in waters beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea of Australia but not beyond the outer limits of the contiguous zone of Australia; and

the relevant offence in respect of which it becomes apparent that access to data held in a computer on the vessel will be required is an offence relating to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws of Australia;

a vessel that is registered under the law of a foreign country is in waters beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea of Australia but not beyond the outer limits of the Australian fishing zone; and

(b) the relevant offence in respect of which it becomes apparent that access to data held in a computer on the vessel will be required is an offence against Fisheries Management Act 1991 or section 46A, 46B, 46C, 46D, 49A or 51A of the Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984;section 100, 100A, 100B, 101, 101A or 101AA of the

in a foreign country; or

on a vessel or aircraft that is registered under the law of a foreign country;

any information (other than network activity warrant intercept information) obtained from access to data under a network activity warrant; or

any information obtained from the use of a surveillance device under a network activity warrant; or

information relating to an application for, the issue of, the existence of, or the expiration of, a network activity warrant; or

any information that is likely to enable the identification of:

a criminal network of individuals specified in a network activity warrant; or

an individual in a criminal network of individuals specified in a network activity warrant; or

a computer specified in a network activity warrant; or

premises specified in a network activity warrant; or

any other information obtained by a law enforcement officer:

without the authority of a network activity warrant; or

in a case where the information was obtained, purportedly under a network activity warrant, through access to data held in a computer in a foreign country, or on a vessel or aircraft that is registered under the law of a foreign country and that is in or above waters beyond the outer limit of Australia’s territorial sea—without the agreement of the appropriate consenting official of that foreign country, and of any other foreign country, whose agreement is required under section 43E;

the person uses, records, communicates or publishes any information; and

the information is protected network activity warrant information; and

the use, recording, communication or publication of the information is not permitted by this section.

the person uses, records, communicates or publishes any information; and

the information is protected network activity warrant information; and

the use, recording, communication or publication of the information is not permitted by this section; and

the use, recording, communication or publication of the information:

endangers the health or safety of any person; or

prejudices the effective conduct of an investigation into a relevant offence.

the use, recording, communication or publication of protected network activity warrant information in connection with the administration or execution of this Act; or

the use, recording, communication or publication of any information that has been disclosed in proceedings in open court lawfully; or

the use or communication of protected network activity warrant information by a person who believes on reasonable grounds that the use or communication is necessary to help prevent or reduce the risk of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property; or

(d) the communication to the Director-General (within the meaning of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979) of protected network activity warrant information that relates or appears to relate to any matter within the functions of that organisation; or

(e) the communication to the agency head (within the meaning of the Intelligence Services Act 2001) of an agency (within the meaning of that Act) of protected network activity warrant information that relates or appears to relate to any matter within the functions of that agency; or

the use, recording or communication of:

(i) protected network activity warrant information referred to in paragraph (d)—by the Director-General (within the meaning of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979), an ASIO employee (within the meaning of that Act) or an ASIO affiliate (within the meaning of that Act); or

(ii) protected network activity warrant information referred to in paragraph (e)—by the agency head (within the meaning of the Intelligence Services Act 2001), or a staff member (within the meaning of that Act), of an agency (within the meaning of that Act);

(a) the purposes of the Australian Federal Police collecting, correlating, analysing or disseminating criminal intelligence in the performance of the functions conferred by Australian Federal Police Act 1979;section 8 of the

(b) the purposes of the Australian Crime Commission collecting, correlating, analysing or disseminating criminal intelligence in the performance of the functions conferred by Australian Crime Commission Act 2002;section 7A of the

the purposes of the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Crime Commission making reports in relation to criminal intelligence;

the making of an application for a warrant;

the making of an application for the variation of a warrant;

the making of an application for the extension of a warrant;

the keeping of records and the making of reports by the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Crime Commission under Division 2;

the purposes of an IGIS official exercising powers, or performing functions or duties, as an IGIS official;

the purposes of an investigation of an offence against subsection (1) or (2);

a proceeding relating to an offence against subsection (1) or (2).

the purposes of doing a thing authorised by a network activity warrant;

the purposes of an IGIS official exercising powers, or performing functions or duties, as an IGIS official;

the purposes of an investigation of an offence against subsection (1) or (2);

a proceeding relating to an offence against subsection (1) or (2).

a criminal proceeding for an offence against subsection (1) or (2); or

a proceeding that is not a criminal proceeding.

protected network activity warrant information was obtained from access to data, or the use of a surveillance device, under a network activity warrant; and

the warrant was granted in response to an application made by the chief officer of a particular law enforcement agency; and

the information:

is communicated to another law enforcement agency (by communicating it to the chief officer or another officer of that agency) for a particular purpose; or

(ii) is communicated to any agency that is not a law enforcement agency (other than the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the agencies within the meaning of the Intelligence Services Act 2001) (by communicating it to the officer in charge of that agency or to another officer of that agency) for a particular purpose;

may be communicated from one officer to another within that agency for that purpose only; and

must not be communicated to any person who is not an officer of that agency.

must ensure that every record or report comprising:

protected network activity warrant information; or

network activity warrant intercept information;

must cause to be destroyed any record or report referred to in paragraph (a):

as soon as practicable after the making of the record or report if the chief officer is satisfied that no civil or criminal proceeding to which the material contained in the record or report relates has been, or is likely to be, commenced and that the material contained in the record or report is not likely to be required in connection with an activity referred to in subsection 45B(4) or a purpose referred to in subsection 45B(5) or (7); and

within the period of 5 years after the making of the record or report, and within each period of 5 years thereafter, unless, before the end of that period, the chief officer is satisfied in relation to the material contained in the record or report of a matter referred to in subparagraph (i) and certifies to that effect.

must ensure that every record or report that is so received is kept in a secure place that is not accessible to people who are not entitled to deal with the record or report; and

must cause to be destroyed any record or report referred to in paragraph (a):

as soon as practicable after the receipt of the record or report by the agency if the officer in charge is satisfied that no civil or criminal proceeding to which the material contained in the record or report relates has been, or is likely to be, commenced and that the material contained in the record or report is not likely to be required in connection with an activity referred to in subsection 45B(4) or a purpose referred to in subsection 45B(5) or (7); and

within the period of 5 years after the making of the record or report, and within each period of 5 years thereafter, unless, before the end of that period, the officer in charge is satisfied in relation to the material contained in the record or report of a matter referred to in subparagraph (i) and certifies to that effect.

a network activity warrant; or

state whether the warrant was executed; and

if so:

state the name of the person primarily responsible for the execution of the warrant; and

state the name of each person involved in accessing data under the warrant; and

state the period during which the data was accessed; and

state the name, if known, of any person whose data was accessed; and

give details of any premises, if known, at which the computer was located; and

give details of any use of a surveillance device under the warrant; and

give details of the extent to which the execution of the warrant has contributed to the prevention, detection or frustration of one or more kinds of relevant offences; and

give details of the extent to which the execution of the warrant has assisted the agency in carrying out its functions; and

give details of the communication of information obtained by accessing data under the warrant to persons other than officers of the agency; and

give details of the compliance with the conditions (if any) to which the warrant was subject; and

give details of the information that was obtained from access to data under the warrant; and

give details of how the information that was obtained under the warrant was used; and

give details of whether the information that was obtained under the warrant was destroyed or retained under section 46AA; and

give details of any premises accessed, telecommunications intercepted or computers removed from premises under the warrant; and

give details of any activities undertaken under subsection 27KP(8) in relation to the warrant; and

give details of any assistance orders made under subsection 64A(6A) in relation to the warrant; and

if the warrant was extended or varied, state:

the number of extensions or variations; and

the reasons for them.

a network activity warrant was issued in response to an application made by the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Crime Commission; and

a thing mentioned in subsection 27KP(8) was done under the warrant after the 28-day period mentioned in paragraph 27KP(8)(k);

notify the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security of the fact that the thing was done under the warrant after the 28-day period mentioned in paragraph 27KP(8)(k); and

do so within 7 days after the thing was done.

if the agency is the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Crime Commission—the kinds of offences in relation to which information was obtained under network activity warrants issued during that year in response to applications made by the chief officer of the agency; and

if the agency is the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Crime Commission—details of things done under subsection 27KP(8) in relation to a network activity warrant;

Division 6 of Part 2 (network activity warrants); or

the remaining provisions of this Act so far as they relate to network activity warrants.

the communication by a person to another person; or

the making use of; or

the making of a record of; or

the custody of a record of;

a network activity warrant; or

there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that access to data held in the computer will substantially assist in the collection of intelligence that:

relates to the group referred to in paragraph 27KK(1)(a) or to any of the individuals in the group; and

is relevant to the prevention, detection or frustration of one or more kinds of relevant offences; and

the specified person is:

reasonably suspected of having committed any of the relevant offences in respect of which the warrant was issued; or

the owner or lessee of the computer; or

an employee of the owner or lessee of the computer; or

a person engaged under a contract for services by the owner or lessee of the computer; or

a person who uses or has used the computer; or

a person who is or was a system administrator for the system including the computer; and

the specified person has relevant knowledge of:

the computer or a computer network of which the computer forms or formed a part; or

measures applied to protect data held in the computer.

another order under this section; or

an order under section 64B of this Act; or

(c) an order under Crimes Act 1914;section 3LA or 3ZZVG of the

in compliance with an assistance order; or

in good faith in purported compliance with an assistance order.

the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security;

the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; or

(b) any other person covered by subsection 32(1) of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986.

the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; or

(b) any other person covered by subsection 32(1) of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986.

a complaint has been made to the Commission in relation to:

an act or practice of ACIC (except an act or practice of an examiner of ACIC performing functions and exercising powers as an examiner); or

an act or practice of the Australian Federal Police; and

(b) because the Commission is of the opinion that the subject matter of the complaint could be more effectively or conveniently dealt with by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, the Commission decides not to inquire, or not to continue to inquire, into that act or practice;

consult the Inspector-General in relation to transferring the complaint or part of the complaint; and

if the Inspector-General agrees to the transfer of the complaint or part of the complaint—transfer the complaint or part to the Inspector-General as soon as is reasonably practicable; and

as soon as is reasonably practicable, take reasonable steps to give notice in writing to the complainant stating that the complaint or part has been so transferred; and

give to the Inspector-General any information or documents that relate to the complaint or part and are in the possession, or under the control, of the Commission.

made as referred to in paragraph 20(1)(b) of this Act; or

lodged under section 46P of this Act.

records or otherwise uses the information for the purpose of an IGIS official exercising a power, or performing a function or duty, as an IGIS official; or

discloses the information to an IGIS official for the purpose of the IGIS official exercising a power, or performing a function or duty, as an IGIS official.

the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; or

(b) any other person covered by subsection 32(1) of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986.

in relation to ACIC—the CEO of ACIC; or

in relation to the Australian Federal Police—the Commissioner of Police; or

means any of the following:

the Ombudsman;

the Australian Human Rights Commission;

the Information Commissioner;

the Integrity Commissioner;

the Inspector-General ADF; and

for a complaint—has the meaning given by paragraph 11(4A)(a).

ASIO, ASIS, AGO, DIO, ASD or ONI; or

the following agencies that have an intelligence function:

the Australian Federal Police;

ACIC.

for ACIC—means:

the collection, correlation, analysis, production and dissemination of intelligence obtained by ACIC from the execution of a network activity warrant; or

(ii) the performance of a function, or the exercise of a power, conferred on a law enforcement officer of ACIC by the network activity warrant provisions of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004; or

for the Australian Federal Police—means:

the collection, correlation, analysis, production and dissemination of intelligence obtained by the Australian Federal Police from the execution of a network activity warrant; or

(ii) the performance of a function, or the exercise of a power, conferred on a law enforcement officer of the Australian Federal Police by the network activity warrant provisions of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004.

Division 6 of Part 2 of that Act; or

the remaining provisions of that Act so far as they relate to network activity warrants.

at the request of the Attorney-General or the responsible Minister; or

of the Inspector-General’s own motion; or

in response to a complaint made to the Inspector-General;

the compliance by that agency with the laws of the Commonwealth and of the States and Territories;

the compliance by that agency with directions or guidelines given to that agency by the responsible Minister;

the propriety of particular activities of that agency;

the effectiveness and appropriateness of the procedures of that agency relating to the legality or propriety of the activities of that agency;

any matter that relates to an act or practice of that agency, referred to the Inspector-General by the Australian Human Rights Commission:

that is or may be inconsistent with or contrary to any human right; or

that constitutes or may constitute discrimination; or

(iii) that is or may be unlawful under the Age Discrimination Act 2004, the Disability Discrimination Act 1992, the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 or the Sex Discrimination Act 1984;

in relation to ACIC—the compliance by that agency with:

directions or guidelines given to that agency; or

policies or other decisions made;

if the intelligence agency is ACIC or the Australian Federal Police—the conduct relates to that agency’s intelligence functions;

(ba) inquire into action taken by the Board of ACIC or the Inter-Governmental Committee established under the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 except to the extent necessary to perform the functions of the Inspector-General referred to in paragraph 8(3A)(f); or

may, at all reasonable times, enter and remain on any premises (including any land or place); and

is entitled to all reasonable facilities and assistance that the head of the agency is capable of providing; and

is entitled to full and free access at all reasonable times to any information, documents or other property of the agency; and

may examine, make copies of or take extracts from any information or documents.

(a) a complaint in respect of the action has been, or could have been, made by the complainant to any of the following persons or bodies (the integrity body for the complaint):

the Ombudsman;

(ii) the Australian Human Rights Commission, under Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986;Division 3 of Part II (human rights complaints) or Part IIB (unlawful discrimination complaints) of the

(iii) the Information Commissioner under Part V of the Privacy Act 1988;

the Integrity Commissioner;

the Inspector-General ADF; and

the Inspector-General is satisfied that the subject matter of the complaint or the part of the complaint could be more effectively or conveniently dealt with by the integrity body for the complaint.

the information or documents are obtained by the Inspector-General in the course of exercising powers, or performing functions or duties, in relation to ACIC or the Australian Federal Police; and

the information or documents are relevant to the receiving body’s functions; and

the Inspector-General is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the receiving body has satisfactory arrangements in place for protecting the information or documents.

(i) a report given to the Minister under Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013; orsection 46 of the

any other report prepared on a periodic basis, and given to the responsible Minister, that the Inspector-General is satisfied relates to the performance by ACIC or the Australian Federal Police of its intelligence functions;

in the case of ACIC—a report that:

(i) is provided to the Board of ACIC or to the Inter-Governmental Committee established under the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002; and

the Inspector-General is satisfied relates to the performance by ACIC of its intelligence functions;

by the CEO of ACIC; or

by the Chair of the Board and is in the possession of ACIC.

in the case of ACIC or the Australian Federal Police, the head of the agency has not provided the responsible Minister with a copy of a report mentioned in subparagraph (1)(e)(i); or

that relate to the performance by ACIC or the Australian Federal Police of that agency’s intelligence functions; and

that are given:

by the responsible Minister to the head of ACIC or the Australian Federal Police; or

(ii) to ACIC by the Board of ACIC or by the Inter-Governmental Committee established under the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002.

the Minister; or

for directions or guidelines referred to in subparagraph (1A)(b)(ii)—the CEO of ACIC.

disclosing, making a record of, or using, information or a document; or

causing information or a document to be disclosed, recorded or used;

an offence may be covered by subsection (1) even if the offence does not refer to disclosing, making a record of, or using, information or a document; and

without limiting paragraph (a):

disclosing information or a document includes communicating information or a document; and

making a record of information or a document includes reproducing information or a document; and

using information or a document includes dealing with, reading or examining information or a document.

the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; or

(b) any other person covered by subsection 32(1) of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986.

(a) the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security transfers all or part of a complaint to the Integrity Commissioner under Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986; andsection 32AD of the

the complaint or the part of the complaint involves an allegation, or information, that raises a corruption issue;

a person from disclosing hearing material to an IGIS official; or

an IGIS official using hearing material, for the purpose of the IGIS official performing a function, or exercising a power, as an IGIS official; or

an IGIS official disclosing hearing material to a person who is not an IGIS official if the hearing material could be disclosed to the person under paragraph (1)(b).

the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security;

ACC (except action taken by an examiner of ACC performing functions or exercising powers as an examiner); or

the Australian Federal Police;

(a) a complainant has complained, or could complain, to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 in relation to action taken by:

ACC (except action taken by an examiner of ACC performing functions or exercising powers as an examiner); or

the Australian Federal Police; and

the complaint could be more appropriately or effectively dealt with by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.

must consult the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security about the complaint or the part of the complaint that relates to the action; and

may decide not to investigate the action, or not to continue to investigate the action.

transfer the complaint or part to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; and

as soon as is reasonably practicable, take reasonable steps to give the complainant written notice that the complaint or part has been transferred; and

give the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security any information or documents relating to the complaint or part that are in the possession, or under the control, of the Ombudsman.

either:

(i) the Ombudsman obtains information or a document in relation to a Commonwealth agency (within the meaning of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986) in the course of performing a function under this or any other Act; or

the Ombudsman prepares a report or other information in relation to an agency referred to in subparagraph (i); and

the Ombudsman is of the opinion that the information, document or report is, or may be, relevant to the performance by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security of a function of the Inspector-General.

disclosing the information; or

making a statement that includes the information; or

giving the document;

the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; or

(iva) to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986; or

(iva) to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986; or

if the discloser believes on reasonable grounds that:

the disclosure relates to action taken by ACIC or the Australian Federal Police in relation to that agency’s intelligence functions; and

it would be appropriate for the disclosure to be investigated by the IGIS;

if the agency is ACIC or the Australian Federal Police—the disclosure does not relate to the intelligence functions of the agency;

either:

the agency is an intelligence agency; or

the agency is ACIC or the Australian Federal Police, and the disclosure relates to the intelligence functions of the agency;

the agency is the IGIS or an intelligence agency; or

the agency is ACIC or the Australian Federal Police, and the disclosure relates to the intelligence functions of the agency;

on the IGIS’s own initiative; or

if the agency is not the IGIS—on application made by the principal officer of the agency; or

on application made by the discloser.

assisting, in relation to the intelligence functions of ACIC or the Australian Federal Police:

principal officers of that agency; and

authorised officers of that agency; and

public officials who belong to that agency; and

former public officials who belonged to that agency;

conducting educational and awareness programs relating to this Act, in relation to the intelligence functions of ACIC or the Australian Federal Police, to the extent to which this Act relates to:

that agency; and

public officials who belong to that agency; and

former public officials who belonged to that agency; and

an intelligence agency; or

ACIC or the Australian Federal Police, in relation to the intelligence functions of the agency.

communicate network activity warrant intercept information to another person; or

make use of network activity warrant intercept information; or

make a record of network activity warrant intercept information; or

give network activity warrant intercept information in evidence in:

a criminal proceeding for an offence against section 105 so far as the offence relates to contravening section 63; or

a proceeding that is not a criminal proceeding.

communicate network activity warrant intercept information to another person; or

make use of network activity warrant intercept information; or

make a record of network activity warrant intercept information;

activities that present a significant risk to a person’s safety;

(e) acting for, or on behalf of, a foreign power (within the meaning of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979);

activities that are, or are likely to be, a threat to security;

(g) activities that pose a risk, or are likely to pose a risk, to the operational security (within the meaning of the Intelligence Services Act 2001) of ASIS (within the meaning of that Act);

(h) activities that pose a risk, or are likely to pose a risk, to the operational security (within the ordinary meaning of that expression) of the Organisation or of AGO or ASD (within the meanings of the Intelligence Services Act 2001);

(i) activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the movement of goods listed from time to time in the Defence and Strategic Goods List (within the meaning of regulation 13E of the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958);

(j) activities related to a contravention, or an alleged contravention, by a person of a UN sanction enforcement law (within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945).

the performance by an IGIS official of the IGIS official’s functions or duties; or

the exercise by an IGIS official of the IGIS official’s powers;

the performance by the IGIS official of the IGIS official’s functions or duties; or

the exercise by the IGIS official of the IGIS official’s powers;

information was obtained by intercepting a communication passing over a telecommunications system; and

the interception was purportedly for the purposes of doing a thing specified in a network activity warrant; and

the interception was not authorised by the network activity warrant;

a person may, in connection with:

the performance by an IGIS official of the IGIS official’s functions or duties; or

the exercise by an IGIS official of the IGIS official’s powers;

an IGIS official may, in connection with:

the performance by the IGIS official of the IGIS official’s functions or duties; or

the exercise by the IGIS official of the IGIS official’s powers;

accessing a stored communication under a network activity warrant; or

one or more relevant offences have been, are being, are about to be, or are likely to be, committed; and

an investigation into those offences is being, will be, or is likely to be, conducted; and

taking control of the online accounts is necessary, in the course of that investigation, for the purpose of enabling evidence to be obtained of the commission of those offences.

was obtained under an account takeover warrant or emergency authorisation; or

relates to an application for, the issue of, the existence of, or the expiration of, an account takeover warrant or emergency authorisation; or

relates to an application for approval of the giving of an emergency authorisation.

the Australian Federal Police and the ACC; and

law enforcement officers.

a username;

a password;

a PIN;

a security question or answer;

a biometric form of identification.

(a) a carrier within the meaning of the Telecommunications Act 1997; or

a carriage service provider within the meaning of that Act.

in relation to the Australian Federal Police—the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police;

in relation to the ACC—the Chief Executive Officer of the ACC.

one or more computers; or

one or more computer systems; or

one or more computer networks; or

any combination of the above.

the law enforcement officer named in the warrant by the issuing magistrate as being responsible for executing the warrant; or

if that law enforcement officer does not intend to execute the warrant—another law enforcement officer whose name has been written in the warrant by the law enforcement officer so named; or

another law enforcement officer whose name has been written in the warrant by the law enforcement officer last named in the warrant.

the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; or

(b) any other person covered by subsection 32(1) of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986.

the Australian Federal Police; or

the ACC.

in relation to the Australian Federal Police:

the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police; or

a Deputy Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police; or

(iii) an AFP employee (within the meaning of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979); or

(iv) a special member of the Australian Federal Police (within the meaning of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979); or

a person seconded to the Australian Federal Police;

in relation to the ACC:

the Chief Executive Officer of the ACC; or

a member of the staff of the ACC.

the Ombudsman; or

a Deputy Commonwealth Ombudsman; or

(c) a person who is a member of the staff referred to in subsection 31(1) of the Ombudsman Act 1976.

any information obtained under an account takeover warrant or an emergency authorisation; or

information relating to:

an application for, the issue of, the existence of, or the expiration of, an account takeover warrant or emergency authorisation; or

an application for approval of the giving of an emergency authorisation.

a serious Commonwealth offence; or

a serious State offence that has a federal aspect.

using existing account credentials to alter one or more account credentials;

removing a requirement for two-factor authentication;

altering the kind or kinds of account credentials that are required to access or operate the account.

the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police; or

a Deputy Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police; or

a senior executive AFP employee who is authorised under subsection (2).

the chief officer of the ACC; or

an executive level member of the staff of the ACC who is authorised under subsection (4).

one or more relevant offences have been, are being, are about to be, or are likely to be, committed; and

an investigation into those offences is being, will be, or is likely to be, conducted; and

(c) taking control of one or more online accounts (the target accounts) is necessary, in the course of that investigation, for the purpose of enabling evidence to be obtained of the commission of those offences.

(a) in person (such an application is a formal application); or

(b) if the applicant believes that it is impracticable for the application to be made in person—by telephone, email, fax or any other means of communication (such an application is an urgent application).

must specify:

the name of the applicant; and

the nature and duration of the warrant sought; and

subject to this section, must be supported by an affidavit setting out the grounds on which the warrant is sought.

taking control of the target accounts is immediately necessary, in the course of the investigation mentioned in paragraph (1)(c), for the purpose of enabling evidence to be obtained of the commission of the offences mentioned in that paragraph; and

it is impracticable for an affidavit to be prepared or sworn before an application for a warrant is made;

provide as much information as the magistrate considers is reasonably practicable in the circumstances; and

not later than 72 hours after the making of the application, send a duly sworn affidavit to the magistrate, whether or not a warrant has been issued.

subsection (2B) applies; and

transmission by fax is available; and

an affidavit has been prepared;

make a written record of the application; and

give a copy of the record to the magistrate to whom the application was made.

the nature and gravity of the alleged relevant offence, or alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is sought; and

the existence of any alternative means of obtaining the evidence sought to be obtained; and

the extent to which the privacy of any person is likely to be affected; and

the likely evidentiary value of any evidence sought to be obtained; and

the extent to which the execution of the warrant is likely to impact on persons lawfully using a computer, so far as that matter is known to the magistrate; and

the extent to which the execution of the warrant is likely to cause a person to suffer a temporary loss of:

money; or

digital currency; or

property (other than data);

if:

the magistrate believes on reasonable grounds that each target account is held by a person who is working in a professional capacity as a journalist or of an employer of such a person; and

the alleged relevant offence, or each of the alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is sought is an offence against a secrecy provision;

the public interest in protecting the confidentiality of the identity of the journalist’s source; and

the public interest in facilitating the exchange of information between journalists and members of the public so as to facilitate reporting of matters in the public interest; and

any previous warrant sought or issued under this Division in connection with the same online account; and

any previous warrant sought or issued under this Division in connection with the same alleged relevant offence or the same alleged relevant offences.

whether the conduct constituting the alleged relevant offence, or alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is sought amounts to:

an activity against the security of the Commonwealth; or

(ii) an offence against Chapter 5 of the Criminal Code;

whether the conduct constituting the alleged relevant offence, or alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is sought amounts to:

an activity against the proper administration of Government; or

(ii) an offence against Chapter 7 of the Criminal Code;

whether the conduct constituting the alleged relevant offence, or alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is sought:

causes, or has the potential to cause, serious violence, or serious harm, to a person; or

(ii) amounts to an offence against Chapter 8 of the Criminal Code;

whether the conduct constituting the alleged relevant offence, or alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is sought:

causes, or has the potential to cause, a danger to the community; or

(ii) amounts to an offence against Chapter 9 of the Criminal Code;

whether the conduct constituting the alleged relevant offence, or alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is sought:

causes, or has the potential to cause, substantial damage to, or loss of, data, property or critical infrastructure; or

(ii) amounts to an offence against Chapter 10 of the Criminal Code;

whether the conduct constituting the alleged relevant offence, or alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is sought involves, or is related to, the commission of:

transnational crime; or

serious crime; or

organised crime;

the communication, divulging or publication of information; or

the production of, or the publication of the contents of, a document.

state that the magistrate issuing the warrant is satisfied of the matters referred to in subsection 3ZZUP(1) and has had regard to the matters referred to in subsection 3ZZUP(2); and

specify:

the name of the applicant; and

the name of the law enforcement officer who, unless the officer inserts the name of another law enforcement officer in the warrant, is to be responsible for executing the warrant; and

the alleged relevant offence, or alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is issued; and

the date the warrant is issued; and

the period during which the warrant is in force (see subsection (3)); and

each target account; and

for each target account where the holder of the target account is known to the applicant—the holder; and

for each target account where one or more users of the target account (other than the holder of the target account) are known to the applicant—those users; and

any conditions subject to which things may be done under the warrant; and

set out an outline of the investigation to which the warrant relates.

taking control of the target account at any time while the warrant is in force, if doing so is necessary, in the course of the investigation to which the warrant relates, for the purpose of enabling evidence to be obtained of the commission of the alleged relevant offence, or alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is issued;

using:

a computer; or

a telecommunications facility operated or provided by the Commonwealth or a carrier; or

any other electronic equipment; or

a data storage device;

if necessary for the purpose of taking control of the target account as mentioned in paragraph (a):

accessing account-based data to which the target account relates; or

adding, copying, deleting or altering account credentials to which the target account relates; or

adding, copying, deleting or altering data in a computer;

if, having regard to other methods (if any) of taking control of the target account which are likely to be as effective, it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so:

using a communication in transit for the purpose of taking control of the target account as mentioned in paragraph (a); and

if necessary to achieve that purpose—adding, copying, deleting or altering data in the communication in transit;

copying any account-based data to which the target account relates, and that:

appears to be relevant for the purposes of determining whether the account-based data is covered by the warrant; or

is covered by the warrant;

copying any account credentials to which the target account relates;

any other thing reasonably incidental to any of the above.

access has been obtained to account-based data; and

the account-based data is subject to a form of electronic protection;

materially interfere with, interrupt or obstruct:

a communication in transit; or

the lawful use by other persons of a computer;

cause any other material loss or damage to other persons lawfully using a computer.

an account takeover warrant; or

this subsection;

any thing reasonably necessary to conceal the fact that any thing has been done under the warrant or under this subsection;

if, having regard to other methods (if any) of doing the things mentioned in paragraph (c) which are likely to be as effective, it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so:

using a computer or a communication in transit to do those things; and

if necessary to achieve that purpose—adding, copying, deleting or altering other data in the computer or the communication in transit;

any other thing reasonably incidental to any of the above;

at any time while the warrant is in force or within 28 days after it ceases to be in force;

if none of the things mentioned in paragraph (c) are done within the 28-day period mentioned in paragraph (f)—at the earliest time after that 28-day period at which it is reasonably practicable to do the things mentioned in paragraph (c).

materially interfere with, interrupt or obstruct:

a communication in transit; or

the lawful use by other persons of a computer;

cause any other material loss or damage to other persons lawfully using a computer.

the warrant must not be executed in a manner that results in loss or damage to data unless the damage is justified and proportionate, having regard to the alleged relevant offence, or alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is issued;

the warrant must not be executed in a manner that causes a person to suffer a permanent loss of:

money; or

digital currency; or

property (other than data).

for an extension of the warrant for a period of no more than 90 days after the day the warrant would otherwise expire; or

for a variation of any of the other terms of the warrant.

if the warrant was issued in response to an application made by a law enforcement officer of the Australian Federal Police—the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police must, by instrument in writing, revoke the warrant; or

if the warrant was issued in response to an application made by a law enforcement officer of the Australian Crime Commission—the chief officer of the Australian Crime Commission must, by instrument in writing, revoke the warrant.

if the warrant was issued in response to an application made by a law enforcement officer of the Australian Federal Police—the chief officer of the Australian Federal Police; or.

if the warrant was issued in response to an application made by a law enforcement officer of the ACC—the chief officer of the ACC.

a magistrate revokes an account takeover warrant; and

at the time of the revocation, a law enforcement officer is executing the warrant;

the warrant was sought by a law enforcement officer of the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Crime Commission; and

the chief officer is satisfied that taking control of the target account is no longer required for the purpose of enabling evidence to be obtained of the commission of the alleged relevant offence, or any of the alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is issued;

the warrant was sought by a law enforcement officer of the Australian Federal Police or the Australian Crime Commission; and

the chief officer is notified that the warrant has been revoked by a magistrate under section 3ZZUT;

an account takeover warrant ceases to be in force; and

it is lawful for the holder of a target account to operate the account; and

as a result of the execution of the warrant, the holder of the account cannot operate the account;

each House of the Parliament;

the members of each House of the Parliament;

the committees of each House of the Parliament and joint committees of both Houses of the Parliament.

an imminent risk of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property exists; and

taking control of the account is immediately necessary for the purpose of dealing with that risk; and

the circumstances are so serious and the matter is of such urgency that taking control of the account is warranted; and

it is not practicable in the circumstances to apply for an account takeover warrant.

the authorisation must not be executed in a manner that results in damage to data unless the damage is justified and proportionate, having regard to the risk of serious violence or substantial damage referred to in paragraph (1)(a);

the authorisation must not be executed in a manner that causes a person to suffer a permanent loss of:

money; or

digital currency; or

property (other than data).

the name of the applicant for the authorisation; and

the date and time the authorisation was given; and

the nature of the authorisation given.

provide sufficient information to enable the magistrate to decide whether or not to approve the giving of the emergency authorisation; and

be accompanied by a copy of the written record made under section 3ZZUY in relation to the emergency authorisation.

the nature of the risk of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property;

the extent to which issuing an account takeover warrant would have helped reduce or avoid the risk;

the extent to which law enforcement officers could have used alternative methods of investigation to help reduce or avoid the risk;

how much the use of alternative methods of investigation could have helped reduce or avoid the risk;

how much the use of alternative methods of investigation would have prejudiced the safety of the person or property because of delay or for another reason;

whether or not it was practicable in the circumstances to apply for an account takeover warrant.

there was a risk of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property; and

taking control of the online account may have helped reduce the risk; and

it was not practicable in the circumstances to apply for an account takeover warrant.

unless paragraph (b) applies—issue an account takeover warrant relating to taking control of the online account as if the application for the approval were an application for an account takeover warrant under Division 2; or

if the magistrate is satisfied that, since the application for the emergency authorisation, the activity that required taking control of an online account has ceased—order the cessation of taking control of the online account.

order the cessation of taking control of the online account; or

if the magistrate is of the view that, although the situation did not warrant the emergency authorisation at the time when the authorisation was given, the use of an account takeover warrant under Division 2 is currently justified—issue an account takeover warrant relating to the taking control of the online account as if the application for the approval were an application for an account takeover warrant under Division 2.

a magistrate orders the cessation of taking control of the online account to which an emergency authorisation relates; and

as a result of the execution of the authorisation, the holder of the account cannot operate the account;

each House of the Parliament;

the members of each House of the Parliament;

the committees of each House of the Parliament and joint committees of both Houses of the Parliament.

there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that taking control of the account is necessary, in the course of the investigation to which the account takeover warrant relates, for the purpose of enabling evidence to be obtained of the commission of the alleged relevant offence, or any of the alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is issued; and

the specified person is:

reasonably suspected of having committed the alleged relevant offence, or any of the alleged relevant offences, in respect of which the warrant is issued; or

the holder of the account; or

an employee of the holder of the account; or

a person engaged under a contract for services by the holder of the account; or

a person who uses or has used the account; or

a person who is or was a system administrator for the electronic service to which the account relates; and

the specified person has relevant knowledge of:

the account; or

the electronic service to which the account relates; or

measures applied to protect account-based data to which the account relates.

another order under this section; or

an order under section 3LA of this Act; or

(c) an order under Surveillance Devices Act 2004;section 64A or 64B of the

in compliance with an assistance order; or

in good faith in purported compliance with an assistance order.

the person is subject to an order under this section; and

the person is capable of complying with a requirement in the order; and

the person omits to do an act; and

the omission contravenes the requirement.

the person uses or discloses information; and

the information is protected information.

the person uses or discloses any information; and

the information is protected information; and

the use or disclosure of the information endangers the health or safety of any person or prejudices the effective conduct of an investigation into a relevant offence.

in connection with the administration or execution of this Part; or

(b) in connection with the functions of the Australian Federal Police under Australian Federal Police Act 1979; orsection 8 of the

(c) in connection with the functions of the ACC under Australian Crime Commission Act 2002; orsection 7A of the

in connection with preventing, investigating or prosecuting an offence; or

by a person who believes on reasonable grounds that the use or disclosure is necessary to help prevent or reduce the risk of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property; or

for the purposes of any legal proceedings arising out of or otherwise related to this Part or of any report of any such proceedings; or

for the purposes of obtaining legal advice in relation to this Part; or

in accordance with any requirement imposed by law; or

in connection with the performance of functions or duties, or the exercise of powers, under this Part; or

in connection with the performance of functions or duties, or the exercise of powers, by:

a law enforcement officer; or

(ii) the Director-General (within the meaning of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979), an ASIO employee (within the meaning of that Act) or an ASIO affiliate (within the meaning of that Act); or

(iii) the agency head (within the meaning of the Intelligence Services Act 2001), or a staff member (within the meaning of that Act), of an agency (within the meaning of that Act); or

for the purposes of the admission of evidence in a proceeding that is not a criminal proceeding.

must ensure that every record or report comprising protected information is kept in a secure place that is not accessible to people who are not entitled to deal with the record or report; and

must cause to be destroyed any record or report referred to in paragraph (a):

as soon as practicable after the making of the record or report if the chief officer is satisfied that no civil or criminal proceeding to which the material contained in the record or report relates has been, or is likely to be, commenced and that the material contained in the record or report is not likely to be required in connection with an activity or purpose referred to in subsection 3ZZVH(2), (3) or (4); and

within the period of 5 years after the making of the record or report, and within each period of 5 years thereafter, unless, before the end of that period, the chief officer is satisfied in relation to the material contained in the record or report of a matter referred to in subparagraph (i) and certifies to that effect.

is necessary for the fair trial of the defendant; or

is in the public interest.

technologies or methods relating to the use of:

a computer; or

a telecommunications facility operated or provided by the Commonwealth or a carrier; or

any other electronic equipment; or

a data storage device;

technologies or methods relating to adding, copying, deleting or altering account-based data, if doing so is necessary to achieve the purpose mentioned in paragraph (a); or

technologies or methods relating to adding, copying, deleting or altering account credentials to which an online account relates, if doing so is necessary to achieve the purpose mentioned in paragraph (a);

the number of applications for account takeover warrants made by law enforcement officers of the Australian Federal Police or the ACC, as the case requires, during the previous 12 months, and the dates on which those applications were made; and

the number of account takeover warrants issued during the previous 12 months in response to applications made by law enforcement officers of the Australian Federal Police or the ACC, as the case requires, and the dates on which those warrants were issued; and

if one or more applications for account takeover warrants made by law enforcement officers of the Australian Federal Police or the ACC, as the case requires, during the previous 12 months were refused:

the number of those refusals; and

the dates on which those refusals occurred; and

if one or more applications for variations of account takeover warrants were made by law enforcement officers of the Australian Federal Police or the ACC, as the case requires, during the previous 12 months: